In 2016, around 11.5 million documents were leaked from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. The release of the Panama Papers, analysed by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in collaboration with Süddeutsche Zeitung and more than 100 media partners — including several in New Zealand — exposed the systems and mechanisms that enable corruption worldwide.
In a recent ICIJ webinar, director Gerard Ryle and tax justice expert Tove Maria Ryding revisited what the Panama Papers made possible — and why many of the same vulnerabilities persist today. It’s a great webinar, you can watch the full recording below, the Panama Papers are available here.
The investigation revealed how anonymous shell companies, nominee directors and offshore accounts were used to conceal wealth, obscure ownership, and in many cases facilitate corruption and crime. What shocked the world was not only who was involved, but how routine these practices were. This was not a fringe system — it was a parallel financial world operating with minimal scrutiny.
The consequences were immediate. Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson resigned within days of being linked to an offshore company. Vast financial networks tied to politically exposed individuals were uncovered, including associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin and figures connected to power in China, Ukraine and across Latin America. The scale, reach and normalisation of these structures were unprecedented.
The Panama Papers and subsequent Pandora Papers also exposed New Zealand’s role in this system. Reporting by New Zealand journalists found that the country sat “at the heart of a tangled web of secretive shelf companies and obscure trusts” used by wealthy foreign clients, particularly from South America, to manage and move assets globally. New Zealand’s foreign trust regime, combined with its strong international reputation, made it an attractive jurisdiction for secrecy.
Mossack Fonseca had already begun positioning New Zealand as a preferred destination for such structures, promoting foreign trusts that offered both privacy and favourable tax treatment. The revelations prompted significant reforms. A mandatory register for foreign trusts was introduced, anti-money laundering rules were tightened, and disclosure requirements to Inland Revenue were expanded following the Shewan Report. By 2020, the number of foreign trusts had fallen by more than 75%.
Globally, the leak triggered a wave of reform commitments. Governments pledged to end anonymous company ownership by introducing beneficial ownership registers. The UK moved early with a public register, while the EU embedded ownership transparency requirements across member states. The G20 and OECD signalled stronger action on tax transparency and information exchange, and countries including France and Germany pushed for coordinated measures.
Over time, anti-money laundering frameworks were strengthened. EU directives expanded due diligence requirements, while countries such as Canada and Australia began tightening oversight of corporate structures and financial flows.
A Decade Later
A decade on, there has been progress — but it is uneven and often fragile.
Beneficial ownership transparency is no longer a fringe idea. Many jurisdictions now require companies to disclose their real owners, and authorities in countries such as Spain, Germany and France have pursued investigations and recovered some offshore-linked tax revenues. In 2025, the European Union effectively shut down so-called “golden passport” schemes, long criticised for enabling illicit financial flows.
Yet major gaps remain. Access to beneficial ownership information is often limited, trusts remain opaque in many jurisdictions, and enforcement is inconsistent. Illicit finance continues to exploit the weakest links in a fragmented global system.
New Zealand reflects this mixed picture. While reforms to foreign trusts improved oversight, the country has yet to implement a comprehensive beneficial ownership register, and trust structures remain difficult to scrutinise. New Zealand also operates an investor visa programme that provides a pathway to residency, raising similar transparency concerns seen elsewhere.
Ten years on from the Panama Papers, the challenge is no longer identifying the problem — it is closing the gap between promise and delivery. Transparency must work in practice, not just on paper. Ownership data needs to be accessible and usable by authorities and watchdogs. Loopholes between jurisdictions must be closed so assets cannot simply be shifted to weaker regimes. Property markets, too, need to be fully brought into transparency frameworks.
The upcoming UK Illicit Finance Summit in June 2026 — bringing together key financial centres and jurisdictions involved in the generation, movement and storage of illicit wealth — presents an opportunity to accelerate progress. Coordinated, practical action by a coalition of committed countries could still shift the system.
The anniversary of the Panama Papers is a reminder that the networks used to conceal corrupt and criminal wealth are global — and so must be the response. New Zealand’s high-trust financial system, combined with remaining gaps around company and trust ownership, leaves it vulnerable to exploitation. Strengthening legislation, enforcement and international cooperation will be essential if it is to protect its reputation and play a credible role in the global fight against corruption.
